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In a meeting dedicated to one person it is customary to point out that he has many friends.
I shall violate custom by pointing out that Jimmye Hillman has many enemies.  At one point
in time, the legislature of the State of Arizona attempted to more  or less  abolish the entire
Department of  Agricultural  Economics here mainly to get rid of him.  The thought of hiring
a hit man apparently  didn't occur to them.
This is by no means a complete list of his enemies,  however, there are a great many people
in the Department of Agriculture who feel that the world would be a better place if he had
never existed.  A number of people in the Farm Bureau and other agricultural  lobbying groups
also have strong feelings of  this sort.  I think most farmers have never heard of him, but those
that  have probably  regard  him  as  an incubus.  There  are few  people  who  have  so  many
enemies in their field.
I should say, however, of course,  that Hillman does have some friends.  Not all that many
because  people who normally would favor him, consumers of agricultural products,  people
who have been compelled to drink odd-colored water in Tucson, etc.,  normally are not aware
of his role at all and hence,  are not friends,  but they probably would be if they knew about
him.
I usually say that the basic role of agricultural economics is to argue that farmers should
be, by various government programs, given a markedly higher income than they would obtain
in a competitive market.  This higher income, of course,  is paid for by the rest of the citizenry,
and rather by accident, more by the poor people in our society than the wealthy.  The poor
tend to eat the controlled  commodities in larger quantities than the wealthy.
Using this definition  it is clear that Hillman  has betrayed his trust.  He has, on the whole,
favored the poor people who will suffer when food prices are raised, rather than the farmers
who may perhaps have to give up their winters in Florida if the price of food falls.  That he
would have  enemies, granted this approach, is obvious.
But so much for Hillman himself, I would now like to turn to the general subject of my
lecture which is concerned with applying modern techniques of economics to the various crop
restriction programs or import restrictions.  I must begin by saying I don't know very much
about the details of  these programs, although the sponsors of this organization have given me
a quicky course in them.  To take  one example, I like avocados  a great deal,  but I had no
previous idea that I was paying so much more for them than their price just a short distance
south of where I live.
What I specifically want to talk about here is the use of various quarantine regulations to
increase the price of various things, particularly avocados, in the United States [US].  I should
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of the world.  Indeed,  I have a rather general rule which I can give to you.  Whenever you are
traveling  abroad  and you find people  criticizing the US,  the appropriate  response is,  "But
what about your farm policy?"  Since every country in the world has  a ghastly farm policy,
this is generally  effective.
Further, as a matter of fact, our restrictions on farming, etc.,  are relatively mild compared
to those of the European Common Market or Japan or Korea,  from which I have recently
returned.  Bad as our situation is, it is much worse elsewhere.
The specific issue that I am going to deal with today is  a  specific kind of restriction on
imports.  This  restriction  has  the rather  odd  characteristic  that it  is  not  certain  that it  is
unwise.  We can  say with  certainty that  the people who  push for it  most  vigorously  are
farmers who would lose income if the restrictions were not imposed,  but nevertheless,  there
is an argument for their point of view,  which is not one of income redistribution.
The case of avocados is interesting because it is not, like most farm product restrictions,
a pure transfer from the poor to the wealthy.  Although thirty-eight percent of the avocados
produced  in the US are produced by two percent  of the farmers, the rest are produced  by
smaller and not so prosperous  enterprises.  On the other hand,  consumers  of avocados  are
mainly,  like  myself,  well-off.  This  is  however,  a  special  characteristic  of the  avocado
restrictions.  Most  agricultural restrictions transfer money from the poor to the well-off.
The problem here is that our knowledge of medicine in general for plants and animals is
very much worse  than that for human beings.  Further,  there are  far,  far,  more  parasitic
arthropods  which  attack vegetable  products than those which  attack  human beings.  The
result of this is that quarantine,  a technique,  which we used to use to control human disease,
but have largely  abandoned  there, can be argued  for with respect to all  sorts of plant and
animal products.
This phenomenon is not by any means entirely American.  I  accidently stumbled  on quite
an elaborate  cactus farm in downtown Zurich, right on the edge of the lake.  Not a terribly
good place, one would think, for cactus.  I am told there is another  one in London, another
place where one would not expect xerophytic vegetation to thrive.  The apparent reason for
this is that cactus have recently became popular as a decorative  plant in Europe because they
take  so little care and  importation of large quantities of American  cactus, might bring with
it various biological difficulties.  Hence,  growing them locally may be sensible.
This may well have been the reason that they started raising cactus in Zurich and London,
but  I  am  sure  by  now  most  European  governments  and  indeed,  the  Common  Market
Organization,  find themselves dealing with lobbyists from both of these rather prosperous
enterprises.  If we could produce some kind of guarantee that American cactus would under
no circumstances contaminate European cactus, I doubt that it would mean that they could
be exported to Europe in large quantities.
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restrictions on imports of various vegetable and animal products.
Let me turn now to economics,  a subject about which  I know a great deal more.  The
problem here is part of a general difficulty  of government regulation of economic life.  Let me
go back in history and talk about the foundation of the first large regulatory commission,  the
Interstate Commerce Commission [ICC].  When this was created,  railroads were engaged in
vicious  price  competition on  connections between  major  cities where  there  were  several
railroads functioning.  There were continual efforts to create cartels, but these always broke
down.  Many farm communities however,  had only one railroad  and the railroads behaved  as
monopolists would be expected to behave.  This infuriated the farmers.
The continuous breakdown of the cartels between the major cities however, infuriated the
railroads and hence, they put up relatively little objection to a proposal that the whole system
should be regulated  by the ICC.  I should  say that looking back,  one  observes  that  most
American  economists (there weren't very many in those days) were highly  skeptical about the
proposal,  but Congress counted the votes and enacted  it.
The purposes of this cartel arrangement were two, one of which was to improve the profit
structure of the railroads.  A subject which was never mentioned by the Congressmen.  This
is almost a secret.  I discovered it rather by accident  while I was in law school and was doing
a term paper on the ICC.  To my surprise then, but not to my surprise today, I discovered that
average profits for railroads were higher after the ICC had been organized than before.
But the other function of the ICC  in essence was income  redistribution.  The farmers
would gain and people who wanted to ship something from Chicago to New York would lose
because of the adjustment of  the railroad fares.  It should be emphasized that at the beginning
things were no where near as bad as they were later, but nevertheless that was the general
trend.
The  realization  that there  was  something  wrong  here  was  rather  slow  in  coming  in
general, but it did come with the view that the railroads had "captured" the commission.  This
was  the  theme  of a  great  deal  of writing  for  a  long  time  with  respect  to  all  sorts  of
government  bureaus.  It was claimed that they had been captured by the people they were
regulating.
George Stigler in a famous article  denied this, he said they had not been captured  by the
regulated  persons, but they had been set up originally for the purpose of benefiting them.  As
he put it,  complaining  about the ICC protecting the profits  of the railroads  is rather  like
complaining  about  a dentist  fixing teeth.  In both cases they are  carrying  out their basic
purpose.
Of course, the ICC  is long  gone and indeed,  regulatory  commissions  everywhere  are
suffering  from  unpopularity  and  tending  to  be  restricted.  A  new  set  of  regulatory
commissions dealing with the environment has developed and these are clearly not under the
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interests,  but looked at from the standpoint of most businesses, they are undesirable. 1
For a considerable  period of time, the usual response by economists to these things were
simply  to  denounce  the  regulations.  There  was  an  exception  to  this,  the  agricultural
economists.  As I said above, agricultural  economics departments,  thought that their principal
duty was raising the price of food stuffs in order to benefit the farmers.
There were of course occasional  deviationists.  Those traitorous agricultural economists
who  had abandoned their  sworn duty to raise the income of farmers at the expense of the
poor,  criticized the regulations.  Nevertheless,  the Department  of Agriculture  has  pretty
consistently  attempted to carry out this objective.  Mainly, this is through the various crop
restriction and subsidy programs, but they have also manipulated  the quarantine regulations
in order to benefit various groups of farmers.
The fact that the quarantine restrictions, theoretically in order to prevent the infestation
of avocado groves, has prevented the export of avocados from Mexico to Alaska is a pretty
clear indication that prevention of contamination is not their sole objective.  It seems unlikely
that  contamination  of Alaska  by  avocado  pests  would  seriously  damage  the  American
economy.
All of this is background leading up to my main purpose which, needless to say is self-
advertisement,  I want to talk about rent-seeking.  Until recently, most economists,  including
myself made a fundamental  mistake in discussing any kind of monopolistic restriction.  The
conventional wisdom was that when you restricted the production of something in order to
raise the price, the social loss was the so-called Harberger triangle.  This was the consumer
surplus on products that people would have purchased at a lower price, but didn't because
of the higher price.  The purchase of the commodity at the higher price by people who are still
willing to pay was thought to be simply an income transfer from those people to whoever had
the  benefit.  Thus,  according  to this  argument  the restrictions  on the import of Mexican
avocados would lead to fewer avocados being consumed  and hence,  some loss of consumer
surplus, but the growers  who raised the avocados  in the US would  gain exactly what  the
customers lost on the price of those that were sold.
The reason that this wrong is simple.  It contains the assumption that the monopoly  or
restriction was obtained by its beneficiaries without  any investment of resource  at all and this
is  obviously  absurd.  God certainly  does  not  go around  giving people  monopolies,  and
although politicians do indeed produce monopolies for people, they normally expect at least
some compensation for their efforts.  All of the writers in this field, from my pioneering article
on, have thought that the costs of establishing the monopoly must be about the same as the
total monopoly profits.
1There was a period of time when our restrictions on automobile exhaust temporarily gave
American companies an advantage over their Japanese competitors.  There were a number
of economists who thought this was the basic force behind these rules, but I doubt that is true.
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must exist.  J. P. Morgan used to simply pay vastly excessive  prices for things that  he felt
would likely compete with one of his cartels.  When government organization  of the cartel
is  the  technique  used  it  is  necessary  to  get  the government  to  take  the  action  and  the
government does not go about the world doing anything good or bad without being pushed.
We will confine ourselves to talking about getting government action because that is what is
relevant for most agricultural cartels.
Anyone visiting Washington is immediately impressed by the size and flourishing nature
of the  lobbying  industry.  There  are  expensive  restaurants  so  that  lobbyists  can  take
Congressmen and civil servants to lunch.  The government actually maintains  and subsidizes
a theater for the convenience of the lobbyists and their guests.  I am informed that there are
other forms of entertainment available although not quite so publicly.
But  all of this is insignificantly small when one compares it with the benefits which are
achieved.  I used  to  live  not very  far  from the  dairy lobby  building.  It  was  a  pleasant,
moderately sized  office building.  It clearly could  not cost the farmers  anywhere  near the
$500,000,000 a year that the dairy farm extracted from children and other people who wanted
to consume milk.  Their roughly $1,000,000  per election contribution to campaign funds is
equally trivial.
The  same  is  true  elsewhere.  You  may  recall  some  years  ago,  Chrysler  obtained
restrictions  on  imports  of competing  cars which  saved  it  from bankruptcy.  It  actually
produced statistics on how much they paid for lobbying and it was less than one-tenth of one
percent of the value which they had received.  Now of course, I realize that there may have
been some payments which were not recorded, but payments up in the billions would not have
been easily concealed.
The same argument applies to campaign  contributions.  Campaign contributions  get a lot
of publicity.  For some obscure reason, however, the major campaign contributions are almost
never mentioned.  The largest campaign contributions are made by the US government for
the purpose of aiding  in the campaign of the incumbents.
I have obtained informal estimates of the cost of that part of the Congress budget which,
in fact, as opposed  to the law, is used for campaigning  for re-election and the figure I have
received is about two million dollars a year per Congressman.  I have to admit that this is an
estimate based on general knowledge by "well-informed  people"  but I think it is reasonable.
The President, of course, has immense resources for campaigning  provided by the federal
government.  I have  no idea how much  one should  say these are worth.  He has  special
political advisors who are even called that in official titles, he has speech writers, and free
access to all sorts of communication media.  He is the only person in the world who has, not
only one, but two 747s at his beck and call, and in general is supported by these methods far
more than by campaign  contributions. He  and his opponent  probably will get all of their
campaign contributions out of the federal government too.
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probably the reason that Congress is beginning to have so many people who stay many, many
years.  I heard that a few years ago, before the most recent revolution -- the election of the
first Republican  Congressional majority in over 40 years, that the turnover of the House of
Representatives  was lower than the turnover of the House of Lords.
No doubt this would, if anything, reduce the power of the lobbyists.  The Congressman
who depends  primarily on the government for his campaign  assistance does not really need
campaign contributions, although of course, he will accept them with gratitude.  The probable
reason for the steady increase  in the restrictions  on campaign  contributions  in  Congress is
undoubtedly the realization that  such restrictions  handicap the person trying to unseat the
incumbent and are rather unimportant for the incumbent  himself
Most of the campaign contributions are now formally reported and listed, although no
doubt, some escape record.  Here once again,  these total amounts are trivial compared to the
actual benefits obtained.  I mentioned Chrysler above, think of General Motors when they had
a choice between going bankrupt or getting the government  to restrict the import of Japanese
cars.  Certainly they  would  have been  willing  to put up five  or  six billion  dollars  for the
restriction and there is not the slightest evidence that they did.
Nevertheless,  there must be very high costs here.  The reason we know this is that we
observe  people  like  General  Motors  putting  up  new  factories.  Suppose  that  you  are
threatened by competition from a foreign source, let us say Toyota is threatening  General
Motors,  which in fact it did.  There  are two alternatives, the first is to place  a great deal of
time and money into producing new and super-efficient factories which can  undercut  Toyota.
This would have been hard, but I don't think impossible.  The second is to get the government
to restrict the import of Toyotas.
Sensible  management  would  chose the  cheaper  of the two,  and  if we  observe  them
sometimes  putting  up  new factories,  it  must be because  one  way or another,  getting the
government to put restrictions on imports is sometimes more expensive than building the new
factories.  Workers in this area of research naturally wonder where is this large expense?  I
think I have worried about this problem more than  anyone else,  and I must admit that my
answers are not as good as I would like.
The first thing to be said here, is that direct bribery seems to be unusual in the US and
usually when it does occur, quite minor.  I live near the Mexican border and I am aware of
Mexican politics. Mexican congressmen  do very much better than American congressmen.
American congressmen normally retire as millionaires, but not much more.  This seems to be
fairly good evidence that they are not selling these immensely valuable projects.
I should say the same is true in general of American regulatory commissions although not
necessarily  municipal governments.  The members of the Texas Railway Commission, who
controlled oil production in Texas and conferred  absolutely immense benefits on various oil
producers,  never  showed any  signs of becoming  wealthy.  It is true that members of the
commission found themselves being entertained  at places that they couldn't afford themselves,
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Direct bribes, or for that matter, campaign contributions cannot account for these very large
special  privileges  handed  out  to  various  people.  Indeed,  the  activity  of various  well-
intentioned lobbying groups to get the government to restrict  direct payments  of any  sort;
campaign contributions,  elaborate entertainment,  etc., seem very largely beside the point.  The
total amount  spent here is really very  small.
Of course,  lobbying  groups,  such as  Common Cause may change their positions quite
radically if the Republicans  maintain  control of Congress.  Distracting  attention  from the
actual large expenditures that kept the incumbents  in,  was probably something that they  at
least  mildly  favored,  perhaps  subconsciously,  while  the  incumbents  had  a  Democratic
majority.  Common Cause,  looking at a Republican  majority (the Republicans  have already
cut back congressional  privileges) might suddenly discover that the Congressmen  are giving
themselves very large advantages  in the contest with nonincumbents.
But this does not  solve the problem of how these things are paid for.  The first thing to
be said,  is that the whole thing is very much of a gamble.  It is not true that you can simply
pay your money and get a guaranteed change.  You pay your money  and you get a chance  of
special government privileges.  It is a clear cut example of a lottery and  as in the lottery, those
people who win, do very well, but the overwhelming majority of people lose.
As an example, the New York Times of September  13,  1995 carries  in the upper-left  hand
corner of the front page an article entitled "Tobacco  Companies Pump Cash Into Republican
Party's Coffers."  It denounces  payments of a million and  a half dollars from three  large
tobacco companies.  The objective is apparently to prevent the Food and Drug Administration
[FDA] from getting jurisdiction over tobacco.  It is obvious that this is in fact a gamble,  and
the prospect that they will seriously change the likely outcome as a result of these payments
is  quite  small.  Hence,  although  eliminating the FDA would  be worth  literally,  immense
amounts of money to these companies,  the investment  is comparatively  small.
If we  look  over  the lists  of lobbying  organizations  in Washington  and  consider  the
campaign  contributions,  etc.,  we will find that a great many of them don't get anything  out
of the  government.  They  are  people  who  have  bought  a  losing  ticket  in  the  lottery.
Obviously the costs of the losers should be included as well as the costs to the winners, if we
are attempting to figure out how and how much the cost of obtaining these  special privileges
is.  But even if we make this kind of adjustment,  the amount seems to be very much smaller
than one would expect.
After  worrying  and  doing  research  about this  problem for a  good  long time,  I  have
derived two explanations.  I have to admit that these explanations are not as satisfactory  as
I would like, but so far as I know, I am the only person who has produced any explanation
at all.  Most scholars simply ignore the problem.
The first possible explanation is simply that the supply curve  for government  action in





Figure 1.  Supply of government action in response  to lobbying.
Here small investments might be wise but the return falls off sharply.  Indeed,  as shown
by the dotted line C 1, it may even be negative  as large expenditures  attract unfavorable media
attention.  Small investments  by the lobbyists produce  a relatively  small  return,  but large
investments don't produce any return at all.
We can think of it as being similar to starting a new store in a small town.  The return on
the first few dollars of investment may be very high, but as we expand the size of the store,
the return falls off very quickly.
This suggestion would explain a good deal of the phenomena, of course, including the fact
that there are many lobbying institutions which don't seem to get anything at all, but it is also
ad hoc.  I know of no empirical evidence one way or the other on it.  Nevertheless,  an ad hoc
suggestion may be better than nothing.
My second explanation is rather simple.  So simple that I am surprised it hasn't occurred
to other people too.  It is however, once again,  something that is extremely  difficult to test.
In American politics the payoff to congressmen who decide that bread prices should be raised
for the benefit of wheat farmers and to the injury of people who consume a lot of bread comes
through the political process.  They are paid in votes through log-rolling.
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enough includes college students who have new cars, are to some extent protected by food
stamps in the  same legislation  that creates the government  crop programs.  This  is a  deal
between the farm congressmen  and representatives  of the inner cities.
Let us consider a terribly wasteful expenditure,  the Central Arizona Project,  and ask how
did Congressman Udall, a highly-skilled political maneuverer, got this idiotic program through
Congress.  In this case I should say that due to the sinister plotting of various people at the
University of Arizona,  including Jimmye Hillman, Congress was better informed  about the
actual costs and benefits than usual.  As far as I can see, this had absolutely no effect on their
behavior.
The answer is fairly simple if we keep in mind that politicians like to keep their jobs.  To
repeat, the payoff comes in the form of votes.  Congressman  Udall was aware of the fact that
some citizens  of Arizona,  particularly  citizens of Phoenix, thought that the project would
benefit them.  And indeed, it has to some extent benefitted the citizens of Phoenix, but giving
them cash payments five times  as much as the benefit that they have received, would have
been much cheaper for the federal government.
Let me temporarily assume that the project would make votes for Congressman Udall in
Arizona without, for the time being, talking about the reasons that citizens of Arizona would
vote for something which for many of  them is a net detriment.  In other words,  simply assume
the citizens of Arizona liked the project.
Congressman  Udall then made trades  with other Congressmen  in which  he voted for
things that would benefit them in their particular district.  To take one example that always
amused me, he became a very firm friend of environmental groups who wanted to prevent  the
development  of Alaska.  This might conceivable have damaged him if he ran for president,
which he thought  of doing  occasionally,  but as long as  he was simply a Congressman for
Arizona, the irritation of the Alaskan voters was irrelevant to him.
It  was  interesting  in  this  case  that  environmental  groups  and  their  Congressional
representatives  did not show any great signs of being upset by the Central Arizona Project,
although  it involved major engineering projects running through,  what the environmentalists
usually refer to as sensitive environments.  Congressman Udall and the environmental groups
had made sensible calculations  in which they each sacrificed something in order to get what
they thought was a greater good.2
Such trades are the life of democratic politics.  They are particularly obvious in the US
because of the fact that we have no strong party structure.  In a place like England they will
2The New York Times of  November  15,  1995  carried a full page add opposing drilling for oil
in Alaska.  As part of the add they had a set  of pictures of members of Congress listed  as
heroes of the anti-drilling movement.  None of them were from Alaska.
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everybody being involved, as they are in the US.
In all of these cases it seems fairly certain, that the net cost for the citizens  of the US as
a whole is much higher than the net benefit of the group in the given  constituency.  Once
again, the Central Arizona Project is a particularly clear-cut  example  although Phoenix does
face some water problems which without the Central Arizona Project, would probably  require
that they raise the price of water.  It is likely that some irrigation farmers will benefit from the
project, but both of these benefits are very small compared to the cost.
Assume, as I am sure is true, that Congressman Udall  included among his trades support
for the various agricultural programs.  It is likely that in net, the citizens of Arizona lost quite
considerably from the whole package of things that were enacted.
Going back a little in time, Tulsa's deep water port and building  a canal  to parallel the
Mississippi were  equally  wasteful  projects.  Although  I have not looked  the matter  up, I
would be willing to bet that Congressman Udall voted for both of them and that this gave him
political leverage.
But why did the voters buy these projects?  The first thing to be said about the voters  of
Arizona,  and particularly in Udall's own district,  is that if their congressmen  refuse to enter
into these trades this would mean that they would not get their local pork, but the reduction
in pork for the country as a whole would be very slight.  The cost to Udall's constituency
would also be reduced but very slightly. The other congressmen would go through with their
projects.
This may explain the otherwise mysterious phenomea where  public opinion polls indicate
that in general voters dislike Congress,  but like their congressmen.  They apparently realize
that the whole thing is a bad bargain, but think that their congressman  is doing his best for
them, which,  as a matter of fact, he normally  is.
The whole thing is sufficiently negative in its effect  on society, not just the people who
eat avocados,  but all sorts of other people, that one wonders why it isn't eliminated.  There
are two basic reasons for it: one of which deals with what is called in Public Choice "political
ignorance," and the other with an application of "The Prisoners Dilemma."  Let me begin with
political ignorance.
Most of us know something about things that are going on in our government.  We don't
normally know very much,  and we don't know very much on matters that effect us only
slightly.  The reason  for all of this is that  we are  rational. If I devoted  a  lot of effort to
becoming an expert on all the projects which are passed by the government3  I would improve
the quality of my vote.  Since my vote has  only something on the order of one in a million
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3Assuming that is possible.change of being decisive in an election, the present value of that gain to me would very much
less than the cost.
There are two restrictions on this rational ignorance,  one of a general,  and one of a special
nature.  The first of the two general ones is that many people make politics  a hobby. I presume
that most of the people who are listening to this lecture, and later read it, are in that category.
That doesn't mean that they know much about all aspects of politics.
As an example, consider me.  Since I was in high school I have been deeply interested  in
foreign  affairs and I think that I can claim that I am expert.  This has little to do with my
personal  or professional  life.  It is a hobby, like my interest  in biology.
I should say that even though I am by profession an economist,  I never read the business
pages of The New York Times, and never touch The  Wall Street Journal. I am not interested
in them.  I don't think that I,  or the US, loses from this since the prospect of my affecting
politics by improving the quality of my vote on economic  matters is so small.
Most people do know a certain amount  about politics even if they are not following  a
hobby.  After all they will see the headlines while turning to the sports section, and they talk
about  politics occasionally  to pass the time in quiet  conversations.  Their information,  in
general,  is very poor.
Many people as a result of simply pursuing some particular  profession or living in a local
district  know a  certain  amount about what the government  is doing  with respect to that
profession or district.  Most farmers are reasonably well informed about the crop insurance
programs,  etc.,  and  similarly the citizens  of Tucson probably  are  at least  reasonably  well
informed  on the various prospects for improving our interstates.  Most of this information
isn't necessarily good, but it is better than our information on other things.
The result of this is an asymmetric  set of information  on political matters.  The citizen of
Tucson  who  had  heard that the federal  government  was putting  in a  elaborate  aqueduct
system which would eventually deliver water to Tucson,  and had not paid much attention to
it, really didn't know much about it. In particular he didn't know that most of the experts on
the subject at the University of Arizona,  Tucson, thought this was going to injure him rather
than benefit him, as it did.  This asymmetrical information resulted in his being in favor of it.
Further, he had no idea of the various bargains Congressman Udall had made in order to
get the matter through.  Thus, from his standpoint  he thought taxes were too high,  and also
the  projects which he knew about were desirable.4  Thus,  we would  anticipate voters  in
general would  have  asymmetrical  pattern of information.  This  does  not mean that the
4I should  say that, rather mysteriously, this  same asymmetry doesn't seem to apply to tax
deductions. This may be because of constitutional problems in the US, but in England where
there is no such constitution it is very hard to explain why logrolling doesn't principally take
the form of tax exemptions,  rather than expenditures.
59information  is  good  even  in  the  areas  where  they  know  more  than  elsewhere.  This
asymmetrical information tends to make them vote for congressmen  who bring in things like
the Central Arizona Project,  or higher prices on avocados.  Of course,  the congressmen who
get the votes on each of those issues are different.
So much for the information problem. Let us now turn to "The Prisoner's Dilemma."  If
we believe,  as  I  am  sure we  should believe,  that the sum  total of all  of these projects  is
substantially  negative for almost  every  citizen in the US,  why  can't we  get together  and
unanimously vote to throw them out?
There are some cases in which this has been attempted.  President Reagan's tax reduction
bill was an effort to do this, and did succeed  in making our taxes  a good deal less bad than
they had been before.  Many loopholes were closed and the general tax level correspondingly
brought down.  Unfortunately,  Congress has been,  again, behaving  in its usual manner and
added loopholes with the results that the basic rates had to be raised.  However, it took some
years and the initial progress was, in fact,  real.
Lastly, there is Congressman Armey's program for getting military base closures and this
is again a matter of getting a great number of people involved, all of whom lose with respect
to one base, but gain from closure of all the others.  By forcing  a vote on the whole package
instead of one at a time, he has been able to get a good many bases closed.
These are exceptional cases.  Normally, this is not what happens  and the reason is simply
The Prisoner's Dilemma.  It is to my advantage to have all of these things reduced.  It would
be more to my advantage if all of them except the tax exemption on mortgage interest were
eliminated.
Each and every recipient of these special privileges is in a similar position. This leads to
bargaining in which everybody tries to protect their own special interest,  and is willing to buy
off at least  some other people  in protecting  that special  interest.  The  end product  of this
complicated bargaining  is that congressmen  are able to stay in office and we all pay a very
large amount of taxes for projects which are worth much less than they cost.
I have been talking about taxes, but regulations  are the same.  The decision that I can't eat
cheap avocados may possibly be to some extent motivated by fear of insect pests, but other
motives are much stronger.5  At the moment many of these regulations have relatively little
economic  effect.  They  benefit  emotional  groups,  like  those  that  benefited  by  political
correctness, or the environmental group, rather than straight economic  special interest. That
makes little or no difference in the way the political organization functions.
The  problem with this  explanation  of where  the  costs come  from,  like  my  previous
explanation,  is that it is extremely  difficult to  see how one  could test it.  Further, as you
SI understand at the moment the civil servants have said that possibly the Mexican avocados
are free of insect pests.  I don't imagine that Congress will go along.
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field don't seem to be even interested  in the question.  The proof that there must be costs
somewhere  is an essential part of the rent seeking literature.  Anne Krueger,  Bhagwati  and
I simply said that the entire package of the costs of rent seeking,  i.e.,  the inframarginal area
which is now frequently referred to as the Tullock Rectangle, was absorbed by efforts to get
it.  I believe this is indeed true, but proving it is another matter.
What I  have been doing in this paper is suggesting  several  ways in which  it could be
present  and  which  are  not  subject  to  blatant  disproof  It  is  obvious,  for  example,  that
campaign expenditures  are only a very small part of the total cost and hence, the view that
campaign  expenditures  explain  it,  is  easily disproved.  If anyone in the  audience,  or any
eventual readers of this paper has a better explanation than mine, I can assure them they will
get very careful reading from  at least one reader,  Tullock, and  that unless I find something
ghastly wrong with it, I will regard the explanation  as a great step forward.  Still, the reason
why  we have these difficulties,  the fact that there are costs,  and people  put resources  into
creating  them,  is clear  and  simple.  Unfortunately,  it  is a little hard to  put your finger  on
exactly where the cost is.
Thus, we see why we have these unfortunate arrangements,  and I think we can see why
Jimmye Hillman has so many enemies. He tended to get in the way of these special provisions,
and hence  created  enemies.  There  is  a book entitled "How to Win  Friends  and  Influence
People."  Hillman never read it.
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